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Abstract: Previous studies have described various associations between tax policy
and health. Here we propose a unifying conceptual framework of
‘Five R’s’ to stimulate awareness about the importance of tax to health
improvement. First, tax can improve representation and democratic
accountability, and help make governments more responsive to the needs of its
citizens. Second, tax can create a revenue stream for a universal pool of public
finance for health care and other public services. Third, progressive taxation when
combined with appropriate public spending can help redistribute wealth and
income and mitigate social and health inequalities. Fourth, the re-pricing of
harmful products (e.g. tobacco, alcohol and unhealthy food) can help reduce their
consumption. Fifth, taxation provides a route by which certain harmful industries
can be regulated. The paper also discusses the barriers that hinder the full potential
for taxation to be used to improve health, including: weak tax administrations,
large ‘shadow economies’, international trade liberalisation, tax avoidance,
transfer pricing by transnational corporations and banking secrecy. We suggest
that a greater awareness of the manifold associations between tax and health will
encourage health practitioners to actively promote fairer and better taxation,
thereby helping to improve health and reduce health inequalities.
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Introduction
Public debate about taxation is usually focussed on the impacts of tax on house-
hold income and the extent to which it is progressive or regressive. There may
also be some focus on different types of tax (Box 1), and their relative merits.
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In mainstream economics, the primary concern is often the effect of tax policy on
fiscal stability, private investment and other aspects of macroeconomic perfor-
mance. Social scientists, on the other hand, are more likely to emphasise the social
and political dimensions of tax (Moore, 2007; Bräutigam, 2008).
This paper examines the general policy domain of taxation through the lens of
public health with the purpose of describing its relevance to several health-related
challenges. It aims to encourage the international health community to take
greater interest in the formulation of tax policy nationally and globally. In so
doing, it intersects with the analysis of Riku Elovainio and David B. Evans whose
contribution to this special issue, ‘Raising domestic money for health: prospects
for low and middle income countries’, examines the potential of 46 low- and
middle-income countries (LMIC) to substantially increase their health expendi-
tures from domestic sources. Elovainio and Evans argue that measures such as
redistributing existing tax revenues, expanding the tax base by formalising
economies, increasing tax on natural resources and implementing ‘sin taxes’
(taxes on harmful consumptive products like tobacco) can increase domestic
funding for health. This paper both reinforces this argument and expands
it conceptually by offering a framework for thinking systematically about the
multi-faceted interrelationships between tax and health. There is thus much
overlap between the two papers, but it is argued that this overlap is
complementary and underscores the need for further research and policy measures
at the nexus of tax and health.
The paper first provides a brief overview of five different effects of tax and how
they impact on health. The five effects, described as a set of five ‘Rs’ to facilitate
recall, are representation, revenue, redistribution, re-pricing and regulation. It
then discusses some of the difficulties and barriers that countries face in harnessing
the benefits of tax (in their different forms), with an emphasis on low-income
countries (LICs). Finally, the paper highlights some general policy recommenda-
tions and avenues for further research.
The effects of tax
Representation
Representation refers to the role that taxes can potentially play in strengthening
democracy and giving citizens a ‘claim’ over government. By contributing to
Box 1.
Tax is applied in different forms, ranging from direct taxes on personal and corporate
income and wealth, through to indirect taxes on retail sales, consumption of goods
and services, trade and the discharge of pollutants, and mandatory social security
contributions. Tax exemptions and subsidies are also aspects of tax policy
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public revenue generation, tax systems provide a mandate for households and
communities to hold governments accountable and make claims on the state for
the provision of various services and goods, including health services. Further-
more, tax provides a source for public finance which allows governments to pay
for equitable and universal health care, an important issue given the inequities and
market failures inherent in private financing for health care.
In describing the transition from domain states (in which government activities
were funded from surpluses derived from the monarchy’s own properties) to tax
states (in which the state earned its revenue by taxing its citizens), Prichard (2010)
describes the emergence of three inter-connected sets of processes by which
taxation facilitates a ‘political contract’ between states and society.
The first set is described as common interest processes that arise from governments
becoming dependent on tax revenue and thereby incentivised to promote economic
prosperity amongst its citizens. The second set is described as accountability and
responsiveness processes that arise from citizens making claims of government and
engaging in political decision-making as a result of being a tax-payer. This is perhaps
best illustrated by the famed ‘Boston Tea Party’ incident of 1773 when American
settlers rebelled against unjust taxes imposed by the British after which the slogan ‘no
tax without representation’ was coined and used as a rallying cry during the Amer-
ican war of independence. The third set is state apparatus processes which consist of
the development of bureaucratic systems for administering tax, including the creation
of population-based data collecting systems, that in turn facilitates more effective
public sector planning and resource allocation.
Tax systems also affect the governance of society by influencing the social and
political relationship between different population groups within a society,
including groups defined by wealth, geographic region or even gender (Grown and
Valodia, 2010). They can do this by imposing differential tax burdens on different
groups and enabling a redistribution of wealth and income across society. As well
as the potential tangible effects of redistributing wealth (and indirectly, economic
and political power), differential tax burdens play a symbolic role in reflecting
societal values about equity, solidarity and mutuality across society. In addition,
as noted recently by Piketty (2014), the generation of accurate and public infor-
mation about individual wealth that is required for the effective imposition of
a wealth tax can help to shed light on how power is structured across society.
However, the democratic and socially progressive benefits of tax are not auto-
matic and need to be accompanied by political action to ensure that tax is collected
in ways that are considered fair and public revenue used appropriately and
accountably. In the absence of effective forms of direct and representative
democracy, taxes can equally be used as an instrument of appropriation and
subjugation, as was often the case with imperial powers in their colonies
(Fukuyama, 2012).
The potential for tax to catalyse the development of a democratic state can also
be contingent on other means by which a state generates revenue.Where states are
Framing the tax and health nexus 181
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S174413311600044X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 86.161.119.71, on 13 Apr 2017 at 06:57:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
able to derive a greater amount of income independently of citizens or with rela-
tively little organisational or political effort, a ‘state-society disconnect’may occur
(Moore, 2001, 2004). This is typically seen in countries with substantial natural
resource wealth (notably oil, minerals and timber), which can give states access
to ‘unearned income’ in the form of ‘natural resource rents’ (Cooper, 2002).
Such sources of income offer states greater opportunity to exercise power
without the support or consent of citizens, who are in turn discouraged from
bargaining with the state to ensure appropriate use of public revenue. Because
natural resource rents require a relatively small bureaucratic apparatus, they are
also associated with a general neglect of public administration. Natural wealth has
thus been described as a ‘resource curse’ because of its association with corrup-
tion, conflict, war and human rights abuses (Collier, 2008).
Revenue
As already noted, tax is an important source of public revenue that can be used to
finance health care and other public services that promote and protect health,
including education, sanitation and public transport. According to the World
Health Organization (2010b), increasing the efficiency of taxation and applying
innovative financial mechanisms such as financial transaction taxes (FTT) are two
important strategies for achieving universal health coverage. It also funds a range
of political, juridical and economic institutions that are core to the functioning of
societies.
States can also derive income from natural resource rents (as discussed earlier);
charges applied to the provision of services (e.g. user fees) or access to privileges
(e.g. licenses); profits made by state-owned companies and industries; returns on
public investments; or loans or grants. However, generally speaking, tax revenues
are the main source of government funds available for financing and expanding
health care in most nations. In LMICs, they account for ~65% of total govern-
ment revenues (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2011).
Standardised and consistent data on general public and tax revenue in LMICs
are difficult to obtain due in part to different systems of government and tax
accounting. Statistics are often incomplete and not comparable across countries.
For example, while in most countries central government finance data have been
consolidated into one account, in others, central government accounts exclude
certain pools of public finance such as social security funds (World Bank, 2015).
Similarly, the way data on central or federal government tax revenue and local or
state are organised and managed can vary.
On average, both public revenue in general and, more specifically tax revenue,
as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP), are lower in poor countries
compared to middle- and high-income countries. However, within these country
groupings, there can be tremendous variation. For example, within Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries between 2006
182 D A V I D M C C O Y E T A L .
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S174413311600044X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 86.161.119.71, on 13 Apr 2017 at 06:57:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
and 2010, the annual tax revenue ranged from 48.6% in Denmark to 26.2% in
the United States (McQuaig and Brooks, 2013). And, as shown by Meheus and
McIntyre (2016) in this issue, there is considerable variation in terms of government
expenditure relative to GDP as well. For example, while government expenditure
is <14% of GDP in some LICs such as Sudan, Madagascar and Guinea-Bissau, it is
over 50% in Lesotho and the Solomon Islands. Similarly, while it is >55% of GDP
in high-income countries such as Finland, Denmark and France, other high-income
countries have relatively low levels of government expenditure, such as Singapore
(14.5% of GDP) and Hong Kong (19.3% of GDP).
As a general rule, however, the proportion of GDP captured as tax revenue rises
as countries become wealthier in terms of GDP (see Table 1). In addition, there is a
general trend for the tax/GDP ratio to increase over time: amongOECD countries,
for example, this rose from 25 to 35% during the 49 yr between 1965 and 2014
(OECD 2015).
The relatively low tax-to-GDP ratio in LMICs means there is significant potential
for generating additional revenues for health (Laffer, 2004). India is a prime
example. In 2011 the government spent US$18 per person on health, which is
considerably less than the $86 estimated to be required to fund essential and basic
health care for all (McIntyre and Meheus, 2014). However, government budgets
were constrained by the fact that tax revenue, as a percentage of GDP, was only 9%
in 2011 (World Bank 2016). If tax revenue as a percentage of GDP were to be
raised to allow the government to spend the equivalent of 5% of GDP on health,
government per capita health expenditurewould rise toUS$74 and approach the $86
per capita target set by the Chatham House Working Group on Health Financing.
Quite apart from the potential for tax to expand health budgets, tax-based
health care financing systems (including mandatory social health insurance)
creates the conditions for cross-subsidisation and risk-pooling arrangements,
as well as potential efficiency gains from stronger and more strategic purchasing
power and the avoidance of transaction costs associated with multiple and
fragmented risk pools (World Health Organization, 2000). To date, there has
been relatively little data looking at whether different types of tax have a differ-
ential impact on health outcomes. However, a recent study of the association
Table 1. Average tax revenue as a proportion of GDP
Country category Tax revenue as a % of GDP
Low-income countries 13.0
Low- and middle-income countries 17.7
Upper-middle-income countries 20.7
High-income countries/OECD countries 35.4
Source: House of Commons International Development Committee. Tax in Developing Countries:
Increasing Resources for Development. Fourth Report of Session 2012–2013 (International Development
Committee (IDC), 2012).
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between different types of tax and various health indicators suggests that
tax regimes with a stronger emphasise on direct rather than indirect tax are
associated with better health outcomes and higher levels of health spending
(Reeves et al., 2015).
Indirect forms of tax can also be directly associated with health benefits,
especially if ear-marked to support health and other forms of social spending
(Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2009). In Thailand, an additional 2% surcharge on
alcohol and tobacco was used to fund a Health Promotion Fund, raising ~US$50–
60 million a year (Srithamrongsawat et al., 2010). Hungary too levied taxes on
unhealthy foods during the Great Recession, in order to help maintain health care
expenditure at a time of diminished government revenues from other sources
(Mytton et al, 2012). While taxes on tobacco, alcohol and unhealthy food can be
ear-marked as revenue to support additional public spending on health, it is also
argued that such taxes should be collected as general revenue that can then be
allocated as appropriate by government as a whole.
However, the health benefits of tax revenue generation must be balanced
against their potential negative impact on household income, with knock-on
health effects. Tax simulation models from South Africa, for example, have found
that while increased taxes on general income, consumption or both could help
expand health coverage, poorly selected consumption taxes could reduce access to
nutrition and health care for poorer households (McIntyre and Ataguba, 2012).
Redistribution
Tax systems, when designed to be socially progressive and redistributive, provide
the basis for a fairer distribution of wealth and resources across society. As
mentioned earlier, progressive tax systems also enable cross-subsidisation and
risk-pooling within health systems, which enables them to achieve both efficiency
and equity goals. Importantly, as economic growth projections show little pro-
spect of eradicating absolute poverty globally, redistribution is seen as a vital and
necessary requirement for development (Woodward, 2015).
There is some evidence that income inequality is a determinant of health and
wellbeing in its own right (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). This thesis has been given
added impetus by some evidence suggesting that inequality can also act as a drag on
economic performance (Herzer, 2012). The postulated mechanisms by which social
and income inequality generate health impacts include those that are mediated
through behavioural, psycho-social and cultural pathways, as well as through their
impact on public policy formulation. However, the thesis is also contested and
remains an important area of research (Avendano and Hessel, 2015).
Tax policies that facilitate redistribution and fairness within society are there-
fore increasingly viewed as being important and valid public health measures. It is
important to note that the optimal level of income or social equality is undefined
and would be contested. Achieving complete equality through tax-based
184 D A V I D M C C O Y E T A L .
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S174413311600044X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 86.161.119.71, on 13 Apr 2017 at 06:57:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
redistribution is likely to be politically unfeasible and socially unacceptable, and
may be economically damaging. Additionally, the health benefits of ever greater
social equality may diminish: one meta-analysis of multi-level studies has sug-
gested that while reducing the Gini coefficient of income distribution down to 30
may reduce excess deaths substantially, any further reduction has little additional
effect (Kondo et al., 2009).
Generally speaking, direct forms of tax upon wealth and income are more
progressive than indirect forms of tax such as value-added tax (VAT), partly
because indirect forms of tax tend to be flat and do not discriminate between rich
and poorer households. One way to avoid or minimise the regressivity of indirect
forms of tax is to exempt VAT from essential goods that are health promoting
whilst aiming sales taxes at luxury goods. Additionally, the direct taxation of
wealth has a greater potential to enable redistribution than the direct taxation on
income given secular trends in the relative distribution of capital and labour in
economies worldwide (Pikkety, 2014).
It should be noted however that the progressivity of a country’s tax collection
system may only be instrumental in redistributing wealth if also accompanied by
decisions to spend public tax revenue in ways that are progressive (Prasad, 2008).
For example, while the USA’s tax collection system is actually more progressive
thanmost European states (Prasad andDeng, 2009), there is greater redistribution
in European states due to the social welfare transfers achieved after public
spending.
Re-pricing
The ability of taxes to alter the price of goods, services and behaviours provides a
mechanism, not just for raising revenue, but also for discouraging the consump-
tion of unhealthy substances, or inhibiting behaviours that may be unhealthy or
harmful. The most obvious example of this form of benefit is the taxation of
tobacco which reduces smoking levels by increasing the cost of cigarettes (Frieden
and Bloomberg, 2007).
Although many countries already impose high taxes on tobacco, the World
Health Organization (2010b) estimates that a 5–10% increase in the tobacco
tax rate could further reduce the prevalence of smoking, whilst also generating
an additional US$1.4 billion in revenue in LICs and US$5 billion in middle-
income countries (MICs) per annum. This would result in the ‘triple win’
of reducing unhealthy behaviour, raising public revenue for health care,
and reducing the need for expensive treatments in the future (World Health
Organization, 2012).
A potential fourth win is that once a commodity has been marked with a
‘sin-tax’, subsequent public perception of the industry producing the commodity
changes. For example, opposition to the introduction of tobacco taxes in the
form of tobacco industry claims that the tobacco industry was important for
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economic wellbeing and job creation became less salient once the democratically
mandated stigma of a ‘sin-tax’ had weakened the credibility of the tobacco
industry.
With unhealthy diets having overtaken smoking as causes of premature death
and disability in many countries, attention is now focussed on taxing foods high in
fat, salt and sugar that are cheap, widely accessible and heavily marketed (World
Health Organization, 2004; Slimani et al., 2009). InMexico, for example, a sugar
sweetened beverage tax, which came into effect in early 2014 raised prices by 16%
and reduced consumption by 12% (Colchero, 2016). In Hungary, a complex
health-oriented food tax has reportedly led to a 25–35% decrease in the con-
sumption of taxed goods (European Competitiveness and Sustainable Industrial
Policy Consortium, 2014).
Taxes can also be applied to inhibit behaviours that have an indirect negative
impact on health. For example, levies can be applied in order to increase the cost of
polluting behaviour and protect the environment from damage. This could
include the stronger use of taxes to curb greenhouse gas emissions which would
help mitigate climate change and encourage renewable energy development
(Bird & Zolt, 2003; Cobham, 2005a).
Regulation
Taxes can be used to shape individual behaviour by affecting the price and cost of
certain commodities or behaviours. But they are also associated with the regula-
tion of entire markets or economic sectors by virtue of the fact that applying a tax
on a commodity or service requires some form of government regulation and
administration to enable the tax to be collected. This may contribute towards
strengthening regulation more generally in an economic sector that is currently
under-regulated and harmful to health.
For example, as far back as 1980, the Brandt Report proposed a tax on the
global arms trade as a way of establishing arms sales registers which would in turn
increase transparency and help reduce conflict (Brandt, 1980). The illegal drugs
(narcotics) trade is another example of an unregulated market that causes a great
deal of harm through both the effects of drug addiction and poisoning and the
effects of violence and corruption associated with failed attempts to eradicate the
trade. Not only does this unregulated trade cause untold amounts of human
suffering, it generates billions of dollars of untaxed profit every year which is used
to corrupt governments and undermine democracy.
A third example of taxes that can enable socially useful regulation whilst
generating public revenue is FTTs that can be designed to inhibit harmful
speculative commodity and currency exchange, and generate billions of dollars of
public revenue. It has been estimated that a US FTT could raise up to $175 billion
a year (Baker et al., 2009); while a FTT applied across the EU could bring in an
estimated £46 billion a year (McQuaig and Brooks, 2013: 247).
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Harnessing the potential of tax
The preceding section describes how tax can promote health through five different
pathways: (a) representation through more democratic, accountable and respon-
sive government; (b) revenue generation for better financing of health systems;
(c) redistribution of public wealth to reduce social inequalities; (d) re-pricing
of goods and services to foster a healthier food environment and healthier
consumption behaviours; and (e) regulation and control of the harmful and illicit
economy.
However, the health benefits of tax are not necessarily easily achieved. In
particular, for LMICs, a number of structural constraints would need to be
overcome. In this section, we highlight what we believe are the key constraints that
hinder LMICs from making use of tax as a health-promoting instrument.
One important constraint is the weak tax administrations of many countries
which is a cause of substantial losses of public revenue (Moore, 2004). In Kenya,
for example, arrears for tax payment defaults in 2005 were US$1.32 billion and
corresponded to about half the country’s public revenues (Christian Aid, 2005).
Estimates of non-compliance of VAT in some developing countries have been put
at 50–60% compared with 7–13% in developed countries (OECD, 2000; IMF,
2011) and the failure to collect all property taxes due to deficiencies in the regis-
tration and valuation of properties is also relatively common (IMF, 2011).
The problems of weak tax administrations have been accentuated by the
removal of import and export duties as part of prevailing trade liberalisation
policies. These duties were amongst the easiest to administer and previously
contributed significantly to revenue income in poor countries, in some cases 30
to 50% of total government revenue (Murphy, 2007). However, between 1995
and 2003, the share of customs revenues to total state revenues shrunk from
an average of 22 to 16% in poor countries, and from 13 to 7% in MICs
(Martens, 2007).
Such losses in revenue were supposed to have been compensated for by eco-
nomic growth and increases in VAT revenue, but this has not always materialised.
One study found that LICs were only able to compensate for about 30% of
revenue losses caused by trade liberalisation (Baunsgaard and Keen, 2010), while
other analyses have argued that the substitution of trade taxes with VAT has
had negative welfare effects in countries with large informal economies (Emran
and Stiglitz, 2005).
The relatively large ‘informal’ and illicit economy that operates beyond the
ambit of tax collecting bodies is another structural constraint affecting many
developing countries (Bird & Zolt, 2003). In one study from 2003, the ‘shadow
economy’ (the production of goods and services that are deliberately concealed to
avoid tax, social security contributions and labour and safety standards) was
found to have made up 41.2 and 41.5% of GDP in Africa and Latin America,
respectively, compared with 16.8% in OECD countries (Schneider, 2004).
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In general, much larger sections of the population only contribute to public
revenue indirectly through consumption taxes in poor countries compared with
rich countries.
Economic globalisation and the greater mobility of finance and productive
capacity have also resulted in many countries competing with each other for
foreign direct investment (FDI) by offering low corporate tax rates, tax holidays,
free repatriation of profits and establishing export processing zones (EPZs) where
goods can be landed, handled and re-exported without the attention of customs
authorities (Jauch, 2002; Goldman, 2006; Shaxson and O’Hagan, 2013). EPZs
are also associated with absent or low labour standards, non-unionisation and
low wages (Klein, 2001) which pose additional threats to health as well as to
democracy and labour rights.
Losses in public revenue can also be traced to the rise in number and size of
transnational corporations with complex legal structures and aggressive accounting
practices intended to evade or avoid tax. These include ‘transfer mispricing’ and
‘transfer misinvoicing’ designed to shift profits from high to low tax jurisdictions, as
well as other forms of aggressive tax avoidance based on arrangements for paying
royalty fees and making loans between subsidiaries of the same company.
Tax evasion and avoidance, by individuals and trans-national corporations
(TNCs), is linked to the international tolerance of tax havens: real or virtual
jurisdictions that offer low or zero taxation and a secrecy regime sustained through
laws and de facto judicial arrangements. Not only does this allow profits and wealth
to be hidden away from tax authorities, banking secrecy enables the laundering of
proceeds from a range of health-harming illegal activities such as drug, arms and
human trafficking. The loss of tax revenues through illicit economic activities can
amount to hundreds of billions of dollars every year (Cobham, 2005b). The African
Union has previously estimated that $148 billion a year (approximately a quarter
of the continent’s GDP) leaves the continent due to corruption (Jackson, 2006).
Because of the secrecy, the amount of revenue lost to tax havens is hard to
determine. One estimate of illicit financial flows from developing countries
between 2003 and 2012 amounted to $6.6 trillion a year (Kar and Spanjers,
2014). Another study of 139 mainly LMICs estimated that as of 2010, between
$21 and $32 trillion had been invested virtually tax-free through
>80 offshore jurisdictions, of which $7.3–$9.3 trillion of this unrecorded
offshore wealth was accounted for by individual private elites (Henry, 2012).
These figures excluded non-financial wealth in the form of real estate, yachts,
racehorses, gold bricks as well as the drain of human capital. Based on a
conservative assumption of this wealth earning a return of 3% a year, it is
estimated that up to $189 billion per year of tax revenues was lost – more than
twice the $86 billion that OECD countries as a whole spend on overseas
development assistance.
These inter-connected structural problems are clearly not just about tax policy,
but embrace questions about effective democracy, the role and capacity of
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government (including law enforcement and judicial systems), the shape and form
of economic globalisation and global governance. As such they highlight the
point that the use of tax to improve health through the five Rs is not simple or
straightforward.
Conclusion
This article describes how tax has the potential to address many pressing global
health priorities including enduring poverty, widening social and health inequal-
ities, under- resourced health systems and the unhealthy consumption of tobacco,
sugar, alcohol and processed food. Ecological degradation and climate change,
perhaps the ultimate threats to global health, can also be tackled through tax
policy. Illicit trade in arms and narcotics, as well as the harmful speculative trading
of currencies and food commodities can be curbed by tax instruments and reg-
ulation. Perhaps most importantly, tax policy provides a route by which better
and more accountable government can be established.
The relationship between both public revenue in general and tax revenue
specifically with GDP is critical, especially for poorer countries. McQuaig and
Brooks (2013) have examined the association between the level of tax as a per-
centage of GDP and various social and health indicators, and have found patterns
of correlation which support the thesis that tax can play an overall positive
function in society. This would seem to reinforce other analyses suggesting a
positive association between direct forms of tax upon citizens and democratic and
accountable government, outlined earlier.
The potential for tax to be used as a positive and progressive public health
instrument implies shifting away from a prevailing neoliberal orthodoxy that
has tended to neglect the positive attributes of tax policy in favour of deregulation,
privatisation and small government, towards a new political economy that
places greater emphasis on public finance, democratic government, equity and
public-interest regulation. In our view, the health community could help catalyse
this shift. But action needs to occur at both the national and international level.
One action is for the global health community to help direct greater policy and
public attention towards the simple fact that many LMICs have the capacity
to capture a higher proportion of GDP as public revenue. Examples of countries
that have enlarged their fiscal space include Indonesia which increased its tax
revenues from 9.9 to 11.1% of GDP (excluding oil GDP) over a four-year period
due to a simplification of the tax system (World Health Organization, 2010a)
and Vietnam which increased its tax revenue to 28% of GDP over two decades
(IMF, 2011).
A second action would be for public health advocates and organisations to call
for more effective and efficient tax administrations (including better customs
enforcement to detect and halt intentional misinvoicing of trade transactions), as
well as tax regimes that are applied more to income and wealth rather than to
Framing the tax and health nexus 189
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S174413311600044X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 86.161.119.71, on 13 Apr 2017 at 06:57:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
consumption. While responding to the immediate demands of illness and disease,
the health community can also encourage the democratic and legal functioning of
public institutions as a vital public health intervention.
Conducting research on the relationship between tax policy and health would
be a further important action. In particular, more research is needed to examine
the potential impact of taxes on alcohol, sugary drinks and ultra-processed foods
on individual consumption behaviour as well as revenue generation. The relative
advantages and disadvantages of different types of tax regime in enabling efficient
and equitable health financing arrangements could also be better studied.
Research findings and recommendations should however be linked explicitly to
policy reform efforts that take into account the specific political, social and
economic conditions of individual countries.
At the international level, the global health community should also direct
attention towards efforts to curb tax avoidance and evasion, as noted by a UN
Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters which
proposed a ‘UN Code of Conduct on Cooperation in Combating International
Tax Evasion and Avoidance’ (2007). To date, efforts have mostly focussed
on voluntary behaviour change. But in light of limited progress having been
made, rules and regulations that are binding and enforceable are required.
These should include agreements on the establishment of public registries of
meaningful beneficial ownership information on all legal entities; the requirement
for TNCs to provide full disclosure of all economic and financial transactions
including their revenues, profits, losses, sales, taxes paid, subsidiaries and staff
levels on a country-by-country basis; developing a new set of international
accountancy standards that are removed from the control of the International
Accounting Standards Board (a private corporation funded by the Big Four
accountancy firms); and calling for an end to the secrecy regimes of banks and
tax havens.
Developed countries also have an important responsibilities as noted by the
High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda
which called them to seize and return assets that may have been stolen, acquired
corruptly or transferred abroad illegally from developing countries, and to do
more to prevent illicit financial flows from developing countries.
Finally, the global health community are in a privileged position to call for taxes
on ‘global public bads’, as a means of both preventing social harm and raising
additional revenue for development finance. For example, the Technical Group
on Innovative Financing Mechanisms (2004), derived from the 2004 Geneva
Declaration, has noted the feasibility of a tax on heavy conventional weapon
transactions which might help improve population health outcomes and
strengthen health systems, and promote good government more generally.
A regulatory approach towards the illicit drugs might also raise considerable
public revenue whilst simultaneously reduce the burden of violence and harm
caused by both narcotics and the war on drugs.
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